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The Case for Candor
APPLICATION OF THE SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS
PRIVILEGE TO CORPORATE DIVERSITY INITIATIVES
Pam Jenoff†
INTRODUCTION
In July 2009, newspaper headlines across the country
detailed a high-profile incident in which a white state trooper
in Cambridge, Massachusetts had responded to a report of a
possible midday break-in at a Harvard Square residence by
“two males, unknown race.”1 As the trooper, Sergeant James
Crowley, approached the residence, the dispatcher radioed him
that the two men were black.2 Crowley confronted the men, one
of whom turned out to be Henry Gates, a highly respected
Harvard professor and the owner of the house, in the foyer.3
When Crowley asked Gates to step onto the porch and produce
identification, Gates refused.4 The confrontation between the
men escalated and Gates was arrested, taken from his own
home in handcuffs, and charged with disorderly conduct.5
Allegations of racial discrimination followed from local,
national, and international media. Everyone from the Reverend
Jesse Jackson to President Barack Obama weighed in, and
tempers flared. The controversy seemed inevitably destined to
escalate.6 However, a full-scale crisis was averted when Obama
invited Gates and Crowley to the White House to discuss the
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Don Van Natta, Jr. & Abby Goodnough, After Call to Police, 2 Cambridge
Worlds Collide in an Unlikely Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2009, at A13.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Peter Baker & Helene Cooper, President Tries to Defuse Debate over Gates
Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2009, at A1.
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incident over drinks.7 This so-called “Beer Summit” produced
two positive results. First, Gates and Crowley were able to
engage in a difficult but candid dialogue, both at the White
House and on a subsequent occasion in Cambridge, which
helped them to appreciate how the misunderstanding between
them had arisen.8 Second, a task force was formed to study
police-community relations on a broader level, with the goal of
long-term reform.9
The situation that transpired in Cambridge is evocative
of scenarios that play out daily in workplaces across the United
States. Employees raise allegations of discrimination and/or
harassment, based on race, gender, age, or other protected
classifications, as a result of interactions with or treatment by
supervisors or colleagues. In response, companies investigate
and attempt to address these individual concerns. They also
seek to improve diversity and workplace relations at-large
through various types of initiatives. First, using either internal
resources or outside consultants, companies undertake
assessments of their workforce demographics, including
objective factors such as employee composition, recruitment,
promotion, compensation, and retention.10 These assessments
can also evaluate subjective elements such as employee morale,
perceptions, and concerns, and look at the efficacy of equal
employment and antidiscrimination policies.11 Armed with the
results of such audits, companies can provide diversity training
and organize diversity councils or committees in order to
improve workplace relations12
Yet despite the similarities in the tensions and issues
giving rise to the impetus for dialogue and reform in these two
scenarios, these workplace diversity initiatives face a
significant barrier that the Beer Summit did not: corporate
efforts to assess, discuss, and improve diversity are often met
with resistance from a company’s legal department. Counsel—
7

Helene Cooper & Abby Goodnough, In a Reunion Over Beers, No Apologies,
but Cordial Plans to Have Lunch Sometime, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009, at A10.
8
Id.
9
Meghan E. Irons, National Panel Picked to Review Gates Arrest; Police
Procedure Among the Topics, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 11, 2009, at B3; Krissah Thompson,
Group to Review Henry Gates Incident, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2009, at A4.
10
Michael Delikat, The Texaco Case and Lessons to Learn: How Can
Corporations Manage Diversity Effectively?, in LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES 181, 197 (Practicing Law Inst. 1997).
11
Id.
12
Id.
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concerned about the very real possibility that documents and
conversations regarding diversity shortfalls and corrective
measures may subsequently be used as evidence by plaintiffs in
discrimination lawsuits—often discourage, limit, or in some
cases veto outright the implementation of diversity studies and
programs.13 Ironically, these objections preclude diversity
initiatives that might reduce the amount of employment
litigation faced by a company in the long run. They also result
in a culture where open dialogue on diversity issues is stymied
to the detriment of employee relations and morale at-large.
One possible solution to this problem is the application of
the self-critical analysis privilege to documents and other
information regarding corporate diversity initiatives. The selfcritical analysis, also called the self-evaluative privilege, has
developed through the federal common law for exactly this
purpose—to permit organizations to engage in candid selfexamination that has institutionally and socially desirable
benefits.14 It has been recognized by courts in other contexts,
such as aviation safety reports,15 industrial safety team
minutes,16 and environmental compliance reports.17 Applying the
privilege to employment documents such as corporate diversity
studies would allow companies to undertake rigorous selfassessment with the goal of improving workforce demographics
and relations, without the fear of discovery in litigation.
However, courts have been largely unwilling to
recognize the self-critical analysis privilege in the employment
context.18 This has left companies with uncertainty as to
whether the privilege will apply and a general presumption
that it will not—a situation that provides virtually no incentive
to engage in self-examination of workforce issues beyond the
bare minimum required by law, and to do little other than put
a best face on the results of any studies undertaken.

13

Id. at 203; see also Holt v. KMI-Cont’l, Inc., 95 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1996);
Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Hardy v. New York
News Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
14
See Johnson v. United Parcel Serv., 206 F.R.D. 686, 688-89 (M.D. Fl. 2002)
(explaining the self-critical analysis privilege generally).
15
Tice v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 270, 273 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
16
Hickman v. Whirlpool Corp., 186 F.R.D. 362, 363-64 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
17
Joiner v. Hercules, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 695, 699 (S.D. Ga. 1996).
18
See Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The
Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L.
REV. 913, 993-96 (1999).
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Moreover, the fact that diversity documents and other
information may ultimately wind up in litigation has a chilling
effect on workplace discourse, as individual employees may be
reticent to come forward and speak freely for fear of disclosure.
For example, courts have declined to recognize the application
of the privilege for documents containing the conclusions of a
voluntary diversity committee regarding corporate diversity
efforts19 and also with respect to employee statements
regarding diversity in employee relations surveys.20 If
employees are left to fear that their comments made in
contexts such as these may be subject to scrutiny in litigation,
they are surely less likely to participate in such initiatives with
full candor. The net effect is that cultural change is stifled and
the impetus toward improvement is lost at the expense of
costly litigation.
This article argues that courts’ reluctance to recognize
the privilege can be attributed to three factors. First, courts
have erroneously relied upon University of Pennsylvania v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,21 a case in which
the Supreme Court declined to apply the self-critical analysis
privilege to peer reviews conducted as part of the faculty
tenure process, as a signal that the self-critical analysis
privilege should not be applied generally in the employment
context. This approach ignores the significant factual
differences between University of Pennsylvania and other
employment cases, such as those involving corporate diversity
documents, as well as the narrow language of the Court’s
holding construing the issue in this fact-specific context.
Second, courts have misapplied the criteria that must be
assessed to determine whether the self-critical analysis
privilege should apply in employment cases. Specifically, they
have favored bright-line tests that consider whether the
documents were created voluntarily or as part of mandatory
government reporting, and whether the information contained
in the documents is of objective or subjective nature.22 Reliance
upon these artificial distinctions at the expense of the more
nuanced balancing test that is at the heart of the privilege
19

Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 199 F.R.D. 379, 386 (N.D. Ga. 2001);
Vanek v. Nutrasweet Co., No. 92 C 0115, 1992 WL 133162, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 1992).
20
Davis v. Kraft Foods N. Am., No. 03-6060, 2006 WL 3486461, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 1, 2006); Johnson v. United Parcel Serv., 206 F.R.D. 686, 689-90 (M.D. Fl. 2002).
21
493 U.S. 182 (1990).
22
See infra Part III.B.
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analysis unduly excludes documents from protection and is
inconsistent with the purpose of the privilege itself.
Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, courts have
failed to recognize the changing nature of employment law, as
reflected in more recent Supreme Court cases, which
emphasizes the primacy of preventative and remedial
measures by employers in effectuating the purpose of federal
antidiscrimination laws.23 This framework shift provides a basis
for recognizing that self-examination, such as diversity studies
and initiatives, is fundamental to the proactive measures in
which the Court has mandated that employers engage, and
that application of the self-critical analysis privilege to such
endeavors is both necessary and appropriate.
This article examines the need for the self-critical
analysis privilege in employment cases to protect documents
such as diversity studies. Part I begins by defining the critical
role that diversity plays in corporate culture today and
explaining the ways companies seek to assess and improve
diversity. Part II then chronicles the evolution of the selfcritical analysis privilege in the employment context. Part III
examines the historic reasons for its rejection and presents the
three factors enumerated above as the reasons underlying
courts’ reluctance to recognize the privilege.
Part IV demonstrates that by revisiting outdated and
flawed assumptions regarding the respective roles of
prevention and remediation in employment discrimination law
as articulated in more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence,24
courts can and should recognize the self-critical analysis
privilege for employment documents such as workplace
diversity initiatives. This article concludes by proposing that by
engaging in a nuanced balancing test that weighs the relative
benefits and harms that would arise from disclosure of the
documents in a particular case, courts can create a welltailored and clearly defined privilege on which companies can
rely, thereby encouraging corporate self-examination that will
improve diversity and employee relations at-large, while still
ensuring that plaintiffs have access to the information they
need to pursue their claims.

23

Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742, 765 (1998).
24
See sources cited supra note 23.
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UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE DIVERSITY INITIATIVES

Diversity has become an increasingly important part of
American corporate culture in the past several decades.25
Federal laws, such as Civil Rights Act of 1964 (commonly
known as “Title VII”),26 the Americans with Disabilities Act,27
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,28 protect
employees from discrimination on the basis of such factors as
race, disability, or age. However, companies have come to
realize that recruiting and retaining a diverse workforce is
more than just a legal obligation—it is essential for successful
business operations.29 As one commentator noted, “Managing
diversity has been defined as ‘a desire to recognize, respect and
capitalize on different strands and backgrounds in American
society, like race, ethnic origin and gender.’”30
Thus, companies spend a significant amount of time and
resources developing initiatives designed to assess and improve
diversity. They regularly retain outside consultants and/or
create high-level positions, and in some cases entire
departments, devoted to analyzing and addressing diversity
issues.31 Corporations tout their diversity programs internally
as a means of improving workplace morale and promote such
initiatives outside the company to help recruitment,
community relations, and reputation among peer entities.
Moreover, such diversity programs are well received by
federal and state agencies charged with monitoring and
enforcing
equal
employment
opportunity
and
nondiscrimination laws, which generally regard such
initiatives as examples of responsible corporate citizenship.32
For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) Task Force on Best Practices for Private Sector
Employers noted in its report:
[A]s work progressed on the submissions made by various
companies, it became clear that a number of them had done
25

Christopher Reynolds & Jane Howard-Martin, Corporate Diversity
Initiatives and Programs—Between a Rock and a Hard Place, in 33RD ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 39, 41 (Practicing Law Inst. 2004).
26
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to -17 (2006).
27
Id. §§ 12101-12213.
28
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
29
Delikat, supra note 10, at 196.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 197-98.
32
Reynolds & Howard-Martin, supra note 25, at 41.
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outstanding work in formulating comprehensive EEO and diversity
strategies. Further, these companies impressed the Task Force with
their ability to integrate workplace EEO and diversity into their
basic business plans. The latter concept, i.e., that in a diverse nation
and in a diverse world, having a diverse workforce is, at least, a
business asset and, more likely, a business necessity, is the primary
revelation of the work done by the Task Force.33

Diversity programs generally operate on two levels: first,
persons charged with diversity matters conduct audits of various
components of workplace diversity. These may include a
snapshot of the demographic composition of the workforce
overall, as well as an examination of protected groups in
comparison with the larger population with respect to factors
such as recruitment, promotions, compensation, and retention.34
They also evaluate the efficacy of relevant company policies and
procedures and may look at the history of discrimination and
harassment complaints made both internally and to outside
agencies.35 Additionally, such studies also assess subjective
issues, including employee opinions, concerns, and morale,
through surveys, interviews, and focus groups.36
Diversity studies may reveal institutional problems
such as disparities in compensation, trends with respect to
certain types of discrimination complaints, or endemic
perception issues. Armed with the results of the audit,
companies then embark upon the second component of most
diversity programs: remediation and improvement.37 (Of course,
companies may also undertake training and other initiatives
without the benefit of diversity studies; however, the results of
such self-examination enable an organization to custom tailor a
diversity program and direct resources to the areas with the
greatest need.) Initiatives may include reassessment of
practices and policies, as well as training of supervisors and
the workforce at-large.38
In addition, many companies seek to implement a
diversity committee or council to improve workplace relations.39
33

EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, BEST PRACTICES FOR PRIVATE SECTOR
EMPLOYERS (2009), available at http://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_reports/best_practices.
cfm?renderforprint=1.
34
Delikat, supra note 10, at 197-98.
35
Id. at 199.
36
Id. at 198-99.
37
Id. at 200-01.
38
Id.
39
See id. at 202.
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Such an entity, generally made up of a wide range of employees
representing various demographic groups and job levels, may
engage in numerous activities, from informal discussions of
prejudices and stereotypes they perceive within the company or
larger society, to role playing and exercises, and even crafting
suggestions for corporate reform.40 Indeed, such dialogues may
also be useful in revealing previously undisclosed biases that
need to be addressed.41
Attempts to undertake the aforementioned diversity
initiatives are greatly limited, however, by concerns over
potential legal liability. In-house counsel, or in some cases
outside counsel acting in a policing function, may restrict or
reject diversity assessments and dialogues out of concern that
problems revealed in the self-audit or the comments made in
diversity discussions may be discoverable and used against the
company as evidence of discrimination or harassment in
subsequent employment litigation. Where assessments are
permitted to proceed, the scope and rigor of the analysis, as
well as the content of the final results, may be severely
constrained by these liability concerns.42
II.

HISTORY OF THE SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE IN
THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT

Evidentiary privileges are, by definition, the narrow
exceptions to the rule that plaintiffs are entitled to unfettered
discovery of “every man’s evidence.”43 They reflect societal
choices that certain relationships (such as those between
husbands and wives) or activities (such as seeking legal or
medical advice) should be valued above others.
The concept of privilege, which dates back to the
sixteenth-century institution of compulsory appearance at
court in the English common law system, evolved from two
40

See id. at 200.
See Pollard, supra note 18, at 947.
42
See Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study
of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191, 271-74 (1989) (noting attorneys’ propensity
to sanitize advice where privilege is not available). Conversely, this study found that in
the scenario where a well-established privilege such as the attorney-client privilege could
be relied upon, two-thirds of attorneys surveyed indicated that they had specifically
raised the privilege as a means of encouraging candid discourse. Id. at 243.
43
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (3d ed. 1940)); see also John Louis Kellog, What’s Good for
the Goose…Differential Treatment of the Deliberative Process and Self-Critical Analysis
Privileges, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 255, 256 (1997).
41
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different theoretical schools.44 Early notions of privilege were
grounded in a humanist rationale, which based the justification
for withholding certain information from discovery upon
normative human values such as honor and privacy.45
However, modern privilege law derives primarily from a
second, instrumentalist theory, which explains that “the primary
justification for privileges is that if confidential communications
or documents are subject to discovery in litigation, this lack of
complete confidentiality will negatively affect numerous sociallyuseful functions and relationships.”46 Thus, under an
instrumentalist conception, society needs privileges because in
their absence, individuals will be discouraged from engaging in
certain socially desirable behavior.47
The instrumentalist rationale was codified by John
Henry Wigmore, who, in his treatise on evidence, set forth four
fundamental criteria necessary for the establishment of a
privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not
be disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the
full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. (3)
The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought
to be sedulously fostered. (4) The injury that would inure to the relation
by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit
thereby gained for correct disposal of the litigation.48

These considerations generally underpin the application of
modern privilege theory, including that of the self-critical
analysis privilege.
A.

The Employment Context

As a preliminary matter, it is significant to note that the
majority of employment cases are brought pursuant to the
federal nondiscrimination statutes, such as Civil Rights Act of
1964 (commonly known as “Title VII”),49 the Americans with
Disabilities Act,50 and the Age Discrimination in Employment
44

EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE
98 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2002).
45
Id. at 105.
46
Id. at 108-09.
47
Id. at 110-12; see also Pollard, supra note 18, at 998.
48
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 527 (Little,
Brown & Co. 1961).
49
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to -17 (2006).
50
Id. §§ 12101-12213.
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Act.51 Thus, the battle over the self-critical analysis privilege in
the employment context has been fought primarily in the
federal courts.
It is also important to recognize that the debate over the
self-critical analysis privilege in the employment context
initially arose with respect to affirmative action plans, and the
cases have largely focused on that issue.52 Employers who are
awarded government contracts are generally required under
Executive Order 11246 to submit to the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) annual Equal
Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action reports.
These reports detail objective data as to the hiring,
termination, compensation, and promotions of candidates in
protected groups in comparison to the workforce at-large, and
subjective analysis as to how the employer assesses its own
performance and intends to improve in the coming year.53
Plaintiffs in employment litigation have sought access not only
to the empirical data submitted to the government with respect
to affirmative action, but also to the subjective portions of the
reports in which employers are required to address deficiencies
and propose plans to improve same.54
The discoverability of mandatory affirmative action
plans prepared for the OFCCP, while informative from a
historical perspective, is not the focus of this article. First,
since only companies with government contracts are required
to submit affirmative action reports, the discussion of that
issue alone has narrow application. Moreover, the peculiarities
of OFCCP affirmative action programs, in terms of their
mandatory nature and specific reporting requirements, render
them inapposite for the present discussion of diversity
initiatives, most of which are voluntary. Most fundamentally,
the continued reliance on these programs as the primary
vehicle for debate is misplaced. Before the development of the
present-day diversity management culture, the self-analysis
51

29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
See generally Ellen Deason, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege and
Discovery of Affirmative Action Plans in Title VII Suits, 83 MICH. L. REV. 405 (1984);
see also Donald P. Vandegrift, Jr., The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis: A Survey of
the Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 171, 180 (1996) (“In general, the battleground [for the selfcritical analysis privilege] in equal employment cases is the affirmative action plan.”).
53
41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7 (2006).
54
See, e.g., Witten v. A.H. Smith & Co., 100 F.R.D. 446 (D. Md. 1984), aff’d,
785 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1986); Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1448 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
52
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done as part of the OFCCP process was once the predominant
means by which companies assessed workforce diversity.
Today, however, it is largely ancillary to the myriad other tools
of self-assessment and self-improvement that companies seek
to undertake voluntarily as a business best practice with
respect to diversity initiatives globally and not just those
required by government contracts.
B.

Origins of the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege

For the many employment discrimination lawsuits that
arise under the numerous federal statutes protecting
employees from discrimination, federal evidentiary privileges
will apply. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience.55

Thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence grant authority to
federal courts to recognize privileges as they evolve and
develop in the common law. By enacting Rule 501 rather than
specific privilege rules, Congress’s purpose was “to provide the
courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case
by case basis.”56
The self-critical analysis privilege is such a privilege,
created not by the Constitution, Congress, or the Supreme
Court, but rather through federal jurisprudence of the past
four decades. The foundation for the privilege was laid by the
District Court for the District of Columbia in 1970.57 In Bredice
v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., the court held that the defendant
hospital’s meeting minutes and reports regarding a patient’s
death were not subject to discovery in a medical malpractice
action.58 The court did not specifically mention the self-critical
analysis privilege, but noted that “[t]here is an overwhelming
public interest in having those staff meetings held on a
55

FED. R. EVID. 501.
120 CONG. REC. 40,891 (1974).
57
Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), aff’d, 479 F.2d
920 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Vandegrift, supra note 52, at 178.
58
Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 251.
56
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confidential basis so that the flow of ideas and advice can
continue unimpeded. . . . These committee meetings, being
retrospective with the purpose of self improvement, are entitled
to a qualified privilege on the basis of this overwhelming public
interest.”59 The court also observed that “[c]onstructive
professional criticism cannot occur in an atmosphere of
apprehension” that such materials might be used against the
organization in subsequent litigation.60
Thus in Bredice, a court recognized for the first time
that there was a strong public interest in allowing the free
discussion of information in socially useful critical selfexamination, and that if discovery of such materials were
allowed, the flow of information would halt.
1. Early Recognition in the Employment Context
Consideration of the self-critical analysis privilege in
the employment context soon followed in a 1971 case before a
Georgia district court.61 In Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., the
defendant company in a race discrimination action sought to
withhold the reports of an internal team appointed to study
affirmative action issues, the results of which were
incorporated into the company’s formal submission to the
Department of Defense Contracts Compliance Program.62 The
court held that plaintiffs were not entitled to the team reports
when such reports have been made in an attempt to affirmatively
strengthen the Company’s policy of compliance with Title VII and
Executive Order 11246. The Court looks on this as an important
issue of public policy and feels it would be contrary to that policy to
discourage frank self-criticism and evaluation in the development of
affirmative action programs of this kind.63

Other courts in the years immediately following the
Banks case similarly declined to require disclosure of internal
assessments that companies had undertaken as part of their
affirmative action reporting requirements. For example, in
Dickerson v. U.S. Steel Corp., a Pennsylvania district court
held that corporate documents containing goals and timetables
59

Id.; see also Brad Bacon, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis: Encouraging
Recognition of the Misunderstood Privilege, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL. 221, 221 (1999).
60
Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 250.
61
Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 53 F.R.D. 283, 284 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
62
Id.
63
Id. at 285.
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for affirmative action programs that were prepared in
conjunction with federal reporting requirements were not
discoverable, noting, “[d]isclosure of such subjective
information could discourage employers from making the
candid internal evaluations that the affirmative action
program envisions. . . . Under these circumstances we hold that
the public policy against disclosure outweigh the plaintiffs’
need for these materials.”64
Similarly, in Sanday v. Carnegie Mellon University,
another Pennsylvania district court held that the defendant’s
affirmative action plans were not discoverable and observed,
“[i]n view of governmental requirements which foster candid
reflection and internal evaluation we firmly believe that such
policy determinations, while possible [sic] relevant, should not
be made available to party litigants for the simple reason that
the primary purpose behind such regulation may be destroyed.”65
In Stevenson v. General Electric, an Ohio district court
likewise held that affirmative action reports were not
discoverable in a discrimination suit. In reaching this
conclusion, the court noted, “[t]he public policy behind these
enactments mandates frank self-criticism and evaluation.”66
The court acknowledged the decisions of other courts that had
applied the privilege to such documents: “The courts
determined that to allow discovery of these reports would deter
this policy. We find the reasoning of these latter courts cogent
and persuasive.”67
Thus, employment documents appeared on track to enjoy
equal footing with respect to the self-critical analysis privilege.
2. The Webb/O’Connor Retreat
However, in 1978, the courts began an abrupt pattern of
reversal and retreat. In Webb v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., a
Pennsylvania district court held that various employer
documents—including notes from meetings where affirmative
action and racial issues were discussed and internal studies

64

14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1448, 1449 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 101, 103 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
66
Stevenson v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. C-1-77-122, 1978 WL 150, at *2 (S.D. Ohio
Oct. 4, 1978).
67
Id.; see also McClain v. Mac Trucks, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 53, 58 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(holding that affirmative action plans were privileged and not discoverable); Rosario v.
N.Y. Times Co., 84 F.R.D. 626, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
65
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assessing race discrimination in various phases of
employment—were discoverable.68
In reaching this conclusion, the Webb court delineated a
three-part test to be used in determining whether the selfcritical analysis privilege applied to employment documents.69
First, the court held that in order to be privileged, the
documents must have been prepared as part of reporting that
was mandated by the government, such as OFCCP affirmative
action reports.70 Second, the court held that with respect to such
mandatory reports, the privilege would only protect subjective
portions of the analysis, and not any objective data contained
therein.71 Finally, the test required that in determining the
applicability of the privilege, courts should weigh the relative
harm and benefit to be derived from disclosure, and deny
discovery only where the detrimental effects of disclosure
clearly outweighed the plaintiff’s need for the documents.72 The
court admonished that, in undertaking this balancing test, it
was necessary to be “sensitive to the need of the plaintiffs for
such materials.”73 Applying the three factors to the documents at
issue, the Webb court refused to find that those documents were
privileged based on the fact that the company’s reports had been
undertaken voluntarily and were not of the same mandatory
nature as the OFCCP submission related documents in the
earlier cases.74
Though Webb began the retreat from recognition of the
self-critical analysis privilege in the employment context, this
retreat came to full force in 1980 with the decision of a
Massachusetts district court in O’Connor v. Chrysler Corp.75 In
O’Connor, the court held that the defendant employer in a sex
discrimination case was required to disclose portions of both its
affirmative action report and supporting documents that were
based on objective data, as well as any subjective evaluations of
fact that had been elsewhere disclosed.76 However, the
68
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O’Connor court went further, holding that where documents
combined objective data and critical self-evaluation, the
employer would have the burden of creating new separate
documents to disclose objective factual portions of those
documents withheld.77
In reaching its conclusion, the O’Connor court purported
to adopt the three-part analysis established in Webb,
acknowledging as a threshold matter that the documents at
issue were mandatory government reports.78 The court also
conceded that portions of the documents contained subjective
analysis, thus meeting the second criteria for application of the
privilege.79 The court then turned to the Webb balancing
analysis, considering whether equal employment opportunity
would be better served by maintaining the confidentiality of
the documents or requiring their disclosure.80 The court
recognized that “[a] lack of confidentiality almost inevitably
will result in some cramping of the investigative process,
simply because the incentives for any institution to engage in
self-evaluative investigation pale considerably with the
knowledge that the results may be used against it.”81
However, the court appeared to discount any value that
maintaining confidentiality might have, noting, “subjecting the
evaluative conclusions contained in [affirmative action plans]
to discovery would not necessarily greatly deter future selfevaluations or substantially reduce their thoroughness.”82 The
court reasoned that since the evaluations undertaken for
affirmative action reporting were mandatory, they would still
occur even with the knowledge the information would be
disclosed.83 Further, while acknowledging that the possibility of
disclosure might decrease the incentives for candid reporting,
the court concluded that such concerns were not sufficient to
justify withholding the documents because there were other
deterrents to candor in self-evaluation, even absent discovery.84
Webb and O’Connor represent a significant break from
the earlier recognition of the self-critical analysis in the
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
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Id.
Id. at 217-18.
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employment context. Armed with these decisions, courts began
to reject the self-critical analysis privilege for employment
documents. For example, in Resnick v. American Dental
Association, a federal district court in Illinois held that a
personnel practices study performed by an outside consulting
firm and documents produced by defendant’s employee
relations committee were not privileged.85
Courts also began to reject application of the privilege to
the subjective portion of mandatory affirmative action reports,
which had been consistently recognized as privileged in the
jurisprudence before that point. For example, in Witten v. A.H.
Smith & Company, a federal district court in Maryland held
that the subjective portions of an affirmative action submission
were not privileged.86 The court first purported to consider the
Webb analysis.87 However, despite the mandatory and
subjective nature of the documents at issue, the court turned to
the O’Connor holding to quickly conclude that, in light of the
other deterrents to candid reporting that may exist, there was
little value in maintaining confidentiality of affirmative action
reports.88 Similarly, in Hardy v. New York News, Inc., a federal
district court in New York held that documents prepared in
conjunction with affirmative action reporting, even where
subjective, were not protected.89
C.

The Supreme Court Weighs In

Twenty years after the recognition of the self-critical
analysis privilege in Bredice, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue for the first time in University of Pennsylvania v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.90 Focused narrowly on
the facts of the case, which are not analogous to the claims and
documents at issue in the majority of employment
discrimination cases, the Supreme Court’s holding in
University of Pennsylvania did little to clearly define the
privilege or even confirm its existence. Notwithstanding the
limited utility of this decision, courts have embraced it as the
rule with respect to the self-critical analysis privilege in the
85
86
87
88
89
90

95 F.R.D. 372, 374-75 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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Id. at 450-51.
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employment context, with the majority of courts interpreting
the case to reject the privilege wholesale.
In the case, which involved a sex discrimination claim
by a faculty member who was denied tenure, the EEOC
demanded production of peer review statements contained in
tenure files, and the university sought modification of the
EEOC subpoena based on the “intrusive effects” that disclosure
of such materials would have.91 The EEOC denied the request
and applied to the district court for enforcement of its
subpoena, which the court ordered and the Third Circuit
affirmed.92 The Supreme Court took the question of whether, as
urged by the university, it should “recognize a qualified
common-law privilege against disclosure of confidential peer
review materials . . . necessary to protect the integrity of the
peer review process, which in turn is central to the proper
functioning of many colleges and universities.”93
The Court held that such documents were not protected
by privilege.94 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that
it does not recognize a new “evidentiary privilege unless it
‘promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need
for probative evidence . . . .’”95 The Court further observed that
“Congress, in extending Title VII to educational institutions
and in providing for broad EEOC subpoena powers, did not see
fit to create a privilege for peer review documents.”96
Despite the unique factual circumstances and narrow
language of the Court’s holding, lower courts seemed to take
University of Pennsylvania as a broad mandate to reject the
self-critical analysis privilege in the employment context. In
the years since the decision, courts declined to recognize the
self-critical analysis privilege with respect to a broad spectrum
of employment documents, including: affirmative action reports
and supporting documents;97 assessments prepared by outside
consultants in support of affirmative action reports;98
91
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conclusions of a voluntary diversity committee regarding
diversity efforts;99 investigations into internal complaints of
discrimination;100 materials related to the development of a
sexual harassment policy;101 employee statements regarding
diversity in employee relations surveys;102 documents related to
the impact of a reduction in force;103 an affirmative action study
on compensation;104 and charts analyzing disciplinary actions by
demographics.105
Despite the strong trend toward rejection of the selfcritical analysis privilege in the employment context, a small
number of courts continue to recognize the validity of the
privilege with respect to employment documents. For example,
in Flynn v. Goldman Sachs & Co., a federal district court in
New York held that documents from a consultant’s study on
barriers to women in the workplace, including interviews with
employees and the final report to the client company, were
privileged.106 The court observed that:
[C]ommunications [with] . . . the interviewed employees were made
with the understanding that any comments would be kept
confidential and anonymous . . . [and] that such confidentiality is
critically important to eliciting candid responses from employees
about their concerns. Dissemination . . . even in redacted form,
would have a chilling effect on the future willingness of employees
. . . to speak candidly about sensitive topics . . . .107

With respect to the final report, the court observed, “[f]ew, if
any companies would risk commissioning a candid . . . report if
these reports could later be used against the company in
litigation. The goal of eliminating any barriers . . . is well
served by encouraging such self-critical assessments.”108
Similarly, in Sheppard v. Con Edison, another federal
district court in New York held that documents voluntarily
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studying affirmative action and reflecting employee comments
on same were privileged, noting, “[s]uch a practice would not
only curtail the flow of such information, but may also diminish
the value of the information if companies are too skeptical of
memorializing their analysis and thus fail to circulate the
information . . . .”109
The handful of other courts that continue to recognize
the privilege in the employment context have echoed these
policy rationales.110 As one court noted in holding that an
internal study was privileged, “[t]his is precisely the type of
evaluative and analytical exercise in which the public has a
strong interest in encouraging corporations to engage . . . .”111
III.

REASONS UNDERLYING THE CONTINUING REJECTION OF
THE SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE

Despite the fact that a few courts have continued to
recognize the application of the self-critical analysis privilege
with respect to employment documents such as diversity
studies, the trend in the past thirty years has been one of
overwhelming rejection. The present situation with respect to
the self-critical analysis privilege in the employment context
may be described as tenuous and uncertain at best. The
inability of companies to rely upon the privilege has significant
and wide-ranging implications for diversity initiatives, and
ultimately for workforce relations.
To understand the scope of the problem, it is necessary to
revisit the purpose of the privilege: If consistently recognized,
the self-critical analysis privilege would permit companies to
engage in rigorous self-examination, with an eye toward
detection and prevention of potential problems, remediation of
existing issues, and proactive implementation of new initiatives.
This would result in an enhancement in diversity, in terms of
both demographics and culture, as well as improvements in
workplace relations and morale.112 However, when the privilege
is unavailable or uncertain, as it is now, companies are less
likely to undertake voluntary assessments that may reveal
109
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problems, and are reluctant to engage in the deeper levels of
assessment that could result in institutional reform.113
Given the ambiguous state of the law, employers are left
unable to predict with any certainty whether materials will be
protected. This uncertainty leaves them with the necessary
assumption that they will not. In the absence of the privilege,
companies face a dilemma: Should they engage in the selfexamination needed to affect change and improve employee
relations, but risk creating a trail of documents and evidence
that could wind up in court as evidence against them?
Confronted with this Hobson’s choice, companies will generally
choose to protect themselves from litigation, doing the
minimally required amount of self-analysis, refraining from
asking the hard questions, and putting a gloss on the data and
results.114 Thus, they are greatly hindered, or in some cases
deterred outright, from engaging in self-examination of a
nature and scope that could result in meaningful change.115
A further effect of the rejection of the self-critical
analysis privilege in favor of blanket disclosure is to stifle
discourse in the workplace. Companies are reluctant to allow
employee groups to have candid dialogue where the discussions
and any documents resulting from them are then fair game in
subsequent employment law suits. Additionally, the chilling
effect extends beyond the corporate decision makers to
individual employees, who may be reticent to come forward and
speak freely if they fear disclosure.116 Thus, the complaints of a
few litigious individuals are allowed to stymie the larger
dialogue that can benefit the workforce as a whole.
The deep and far-reaching implications of this problem
demand remediation of the current state of the law.
In order to address the problems that arise from the
failure to recognize the self-critical analysis privilege in the
employment context, it is first necessary to understand the
causes of the rejection. The first is courts’ undue and overly
broad reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in University of
Pennsylvania, a case that, upon closer examination, proves to
be factually distinguishable from the issue of self-critical
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analysis, with a holding that is narrow in scope and therefore
of limited value to the larger issue of employment documents.
Second, the courts’ rejection of the self-critical analysis
privilege may be attributed to a preference for bright-line
distinctions that protect only documents that are prepared
pursuant to mandatory government reporting and that contain
only subjective analysis. Such misapplication ignores the need
for the more nuanced balancing test required by the Wigmore
privilege analysis and unduly excludes a large number of
documents from protection.
Third, and perhaps most fundamentally, the current
state of the law with respect to self-critical analysis privilege
fails to recognize the changes that have taken place in
employment law over the last two decades, through which
preventative measures, self-identification of issues, and prompt
remediation of the same have become some of the most
important weapons in combating discrimination. This
framework shift, which has been expressly sanctioned by the
Supreme Court in more recent cases stressing the importance
of preventative measures, necessitates recognition of the selfcritical analysis privilege for documents such as diversity
studies in order to enable employers to study and ferret out
potential organizational issues without fear that their
initiatives will increase liability.
By looking at these cases, as well as the faulty
assumptions underpinning the lower courts’ rationale in the
existing cases addressing self-critical analysis, it becomes clear
that the privilege can—and should—be recognized in the
employment context.
A.

Undue Reliance on University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC

The genesis of the courts’ present widespread rejection
of the self-critical analysis privilege in the employment context
can be traced to the Supreme Court’s decision in University of
Pennsylvania v. EEOC.117 As set forth more fully below in
Section II.B.3.d, the court in that case rejected the university’s
argument that peer assessments that were conducted as part of
a tenure review process and later were challenged in a race and
sex discrimination case should be protected as privileged from
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an EEOC subpoena.118 In the absence of other, more explicit
instruction on the issue, courts have taken this decision as a
signal that the self-critical analysis privilege should not be
recognized with respect to employment documents generally,
even those that relate to diversity.
However, a closer look at the case makes clear that its
application to the broader issue of the self-critical analysis
privilege in the employment context is of limited utility. First,
University of Pennsylvania involved a dispute over peer
reviews related to one faculty member’s candidacy for tenure.119
These documents, which are in essence performance
evaluations of an individual employee, are in no way
equivalent to the corporate diversity documents containing
self-examination of institutional demographics generally at
issue in employment discrimination cases.
Moreover, in the University of Pennsylvania case, the
peer reviews sought by the plaintiff reflected in part the
employer’s justification for the very employment decision
alleged in the case to be discriminatory, that is, the decision
not to grant tenure.120 Thus, they were highly relevant to the
plaintiff’s individual claim. Conversely, the diversity
documents that companies typically seek to protect by invoking
the self-critical analysis privilege in employment cases tend to
be circumstantial evidence at best, sought by the plaintiff to
show an institutional pattern or practice of discrimination.
They are typically only tangentially related to the specific
issues in the case and marginally relevant.
Thus, the facts of the University of Pennsylvania case
are so inapposite as to render the case of limited applicability
to the broader question of whether the self-critical analysis
privilege should be recognized with respect to employment
documents such as diversity studies. The Court implicitly
recognized these significant differences in the narrow language
of its holding: “With all this in mind, we cannot accept the
University’s invitation to create a new privilege against the
disclosure of peer review materials.”121 Courts, however, have
misperceived the lack of alternative guidance as to how the
118
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self-critical analysis privilege should be applied in the
employment context and have failed to recognize this case for
what it is—a tangential guidepost that does not squarely
address the issue of employment documents.
B.

Discomfort with the Wigmore Balancing Test

A second reason for the courts’ reluctance to apply the
self-critical analysis privilege in the employment context is
discomfort with the balancing test it requires. In his test for
determining the applicability of a privilege, Wigmore
articulated four criteria to be considered: (1) the
communications must have been made in confidence; (2)
confidentiality must be essential to the relationship between
the parties; (3) the relation must be one which the community
seeks to foster; and (4) the injury that would ensue to the
relationship by disclosure of the communication must be
greater than the benefit thereby gained.122 Instead of adopting
this test, many courts have employed the Webb analysis in
applying the privilege to employment documents. However, as
established below, the Webb test is a flawed and problematic
way to assess the applicability of the privilege.
Applying the first three Wigmore factors to employment
documents such as diversity studies, it is clear that the selfcritical analysis privilege should be recognized in most cases.
First, diversity studies, if they are undertaken with any serious
value or intent, must be confidential in order to capture full
and accurate information about a company’s issues.
Additionally, confidentiality is essential, as employees are
unlikely to speak candidly without assurances of such
discretion. Further, improved workforce relations and diversity
are goals that society seeks to encourage.
The only question, then, is to the fourth factor, the
harm-versus-benefit balancing analysis. While the first three
criteria may be contemplated with respect to diversity studies
generally, this final factor must be assessed on a case-by-case
basis, the outcome dependent upon the nature of the
documents sought, their function within the company and the
relationship to a plaintiff’s claims. Thus, the heart of the
court’s role with respect to a privilege determination lies in
considering this balancing test and weighing the relative
122

WIGMORE, supra note 48, at 527.

592

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:2

benefit and harm that would result from disclosure of the
documents—that is, analyzing whether the societal aims would
be better preserved in a particular case by disclosing the
information or preserving the confidential relationship.
The balancing test for the self-critical analysis privilege
does not differ significantly from that which courts undertake
when assessing other qualified privileges. However, when
applying other privileges, courts are armed with decades of
well-established precedent and policy rationale, which provide
guideposts as to the situations in which the privilege should
apply. The self-critical analysis privilege is comparatively new
and the cases applying it are sparse and inconsistent. In the
employment context, the lack of clear guidance is exacerbated
by the changing landscape of the law and competing aims of
providing plaintiffs with access to material with which to
redress their grievances while ensuring that other means of
promoting nondiscrimination, such as self-examination and
open dialogue, are preserved.
The complex nature of applying this balancing analysis
to the determination of self-critical analysis in the employment
context has resulted in courts defaulting to other, more brightline tests, most notably the criteria set forth by the district
court in Webb. The Webb analysis requires a court to consider
somewhat different factors than Wigmore’s analysis.
Specifically, Webb provides that in order for the privilege to
apply in the employment context: (1) the documents must have
been prepared for mandatory government reports; (2) the
documents must contain subjective analysis rather than
objective facts or data; and (3) courts should be “sensitive” to
the needs of the plaintiffs for such material and deny discovery
only where the policy favoring exclusion of the materials
clearly outweighed the plaintiff’s need.123
Courts have embraced the Webb analysis as a way to
assess the applicability of the privilege to employment
documents such as diversity studies. However, it is not at all
clear that application of the criteria articulated by the Webb
court is relevant or appropriate. Indeed, a closer examination
reveals that this test is flawed on a number of levels.
First, the consideration of whether the documents in
question were drafted voluntarily or pursuant to mandatory
government analysis is an artificial distinction. It runs
123

Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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contrary to the very purpose of the self-critical analysis
privilege—to encourage candid self-examination. Voluntary
self-assessment is exactly the type of behavior that the
privilege is entitled to foster, even more so than selfexamination mandated by laws or regulations, which already
contain incentives in the form of penalties for noncompliance.
Conversely, voluntary self-assessment requires the cloak of
privilege; otherwise the reward is little, the risk great, and the
incentive none.
Whether the decision to undertake an analysis is made
voluntarily or required by law, the privilege should apply.
Candor is an essential element of self-analysis—it is essential
not only to the desire to undertake analysis, but also to the
quality and rigor of the analysis. Without the certainty of a
privilege, the depth of such studies will surely be reduced to a
level that is essentially worthless.
The second criteria articulated by the Webb court, that
the documents for which protection is sought must contain
subjective analysis in order to be privileged, also fails to
survive scrutiny. Proponents of such a distinction claim that
the subjective analysis is the only truly self-critical portion of
the documents and that the objective data are just numbers
and statistics that should be available to litigants.124
This distinction is invalid for a number of reasons. First,
the division between objective data and subjective analysis
worked adequately when the documents at issue were
primarily OFCCP affirmative action reports, such that the
types of data sought were mandated by the government
reporting requirements. However, in corporate diversity
studies, the decision as to which data to compile—that is,
which aspects of the business have the need for study and
improvement—is left to the company to decide. Because that
initial determination is intrinsically self-critical and subjective,
that determination should be privileged.
Additionally, when OFCCP reports were the primary
documents at issue, it was relatively easy to parse out the
objective data from the subjective analysis based on the
required reporting structure. This is hardly the case with
corporate diversity analyses, in which the distinctions blur and
the objective and subjective portions of studies comingle. The
124
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approach some courts have taken to this problem has been that
which originated in the O’Connor125 case: requiring companies
to create new documents parsing out the objective data from
diversity studies.126 This “solution” imposes a burden well
beyond the scope of that which is permitted by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.127
Notwithstanding the flawed assumptions underlying
these first two criteria, many courts applying the Webb analysis
have based their determination of privilege on one or both.128 Not
surprisingly, they have frequently concluded that employment
documents such as diversity studies are not protected by the
self-critical analysis privilege, either because they were not
prepared pursuant to government mandate or because they
contain objective data.129 By reaching this conclusion based on
the first two criteria, courts have managed to avoid the need to
engage in the third portion of the analysis—weighing the harm
of disclosure against the benefits of disclosure—altogether.
However, this preference for a black-and-white determination
over the balancing analysis is a misstep that undermines the
very nature and purposes of the privilege.
Moreover, even where courts do get to the third prong of
the Webb analysis, their utilization of the balancing test
articulated in that case, which purports to consider the same
relative harm-versus-benefit of disclosure required by
Wigmore, still results in erroneous conclusions. Using the Webb
test is problematic because it places a higher burden on the
party seeking to invoke the privilege. Under the Wigmore
conceptualization, the party seeking to keep the documents
privileged must show that the harm from disclosure is greater
than the benefit.130 However, Webb has raised the standard to
require a court to conclude that the harm from disclosure
“clearly outweighed” the benefit.131 This heightened standard,
coupled with the Webb court’s admonition that courts must be
“sensitive” to the needs of the plaintiffs, results in rejection of
the privilege with undue frequency.
125
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Failure to Recognize the Changing Landscape of
Employment Law

Perhaps the most fundamental reason for the courts’
rejection of the self-critical analysis privilege is their failure to
recognize the changing landscape of employment law. Courts
rejecting the privilege rationalize that, if it is recognized, big
companies will use it as a shield to prevent individuals from
obtaining the evidence necessary to seek redress of their claims.
However, by relying upon this model (Goliath-company-versusDavid-plaintiff in litigation), courts are ignoring the important
developments that have occurred in the realm of employment
discrimination jurisprudence in the past several decades.
First, it is clear that litigation is not the only, or even
the primary, means of redress. Indeed, it is estimated that only
three to four percent of employment discrimination cases ever
go to trial.132 The overwhelming majority are resolved through
settlement, mediation, or other nonbinding resolution.
More importantly, the courts’ assumption ignores the fact
that most discrimination issues, if properly handled, need not
ever get to the litigation stage. Rather, in recent years there has
been increased emphasis on the employer’s affirmative steps to
prevent and remediate discrimination. This is reflected in a trio
of Supreme Court cases from the late 1990s: Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton,133 Burlington Industries v. Ellerth,134 and Kolstad v.
American Dental Association.135 In these cases, the Court placed
a strong emphasis on exactly the types of preventative and
remedial measures that self-critical analysis privilege is
intended to, and can most effectively, foster.136
The first two decisions arose out of a federal circuit
court split over the standard for employer liability in hostile
work environment claims, with some courts holding that
employers were strictly liable for such claims, and others
requiring actual or constructive knowledge of the unlawful
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conduct.137 In Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, a former
employee claimed she was sexually harassed by her
supervisor.138 The district court dismissed—holding that
because the plaintiff had never complained, the company
neither knew nor should have known about the harassment—
and the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the company liable.139
The Supreme Court held that, with respect to a hostile work
environment claim, the employer may utilize a two-pronged
defense to liability by establishing “(a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise.”140
Similarly, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, a part-time
lifeguard alleged that two of her three supervisors subjected her
to a sexually hostile atmosphere, which included inappropriate
comments, uninvited touching, and offensive speech.141 As in
Ellerth, the plaintiff did not complain.142 However, in this case, the
company had failed to distribute its harassment policy.143 The
district court found in favor of the plaintiff on the basis that the
supervisors were acting as agents of the employer, but the
Eleventh Circuit reversed, determining that the harassers were
acting outside of the scope of their employment.144 The Supreme
Court found the that city had not exercised reasonable care in
preventing harassing conduct on the part of its supervisors,
basing this holding on the district court’s determination that the
city “had entirely failed to disseminate its [sexual harassment]
policy [and] . . . made no attempt to keep track of the conduct of
[its] supervisors.”145 The Court also held that the harassment
policy was inadequate because it did not provide a means for
employees to bypass their supervisors when making complaints.146
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The Court concluded that since the city did not exercise
reasonable care, it could not exercise a defense to liability.147
Faragher and Ellerth made clear for the first time that
an employer had an affirmative duty to prevent, investigate,
and remediate allegations of discrimination, and indeed that in
doing so it could provide itself with an affirmative defense to
discrimination suits. These principles were reiterated by the
Supreme Court the following year in Kolstad v. American
Dental Association.148 In Kolstad, a female employee sued the
American Dental Association for promoting a male colleague
over her, and demonstrated that the employee in charge of the
promotion decision made sexually offensive jokes and
remarks.149 The district court found for Kolstad but refused to
instruct the jury on punitive damages and she appealed.150 The
D.C. Circuit held that the jury should have been instructed on
punitive damages based on the lower court’s finding that the
employer had acted with malice or reckless indifference.151 The
appellate court reheard the case en banc and again affirmed
the district court’s holding, concluding that in order to award
punitive damages, there must have been egregious conduct.152
The Supreme Court considered the issue and held 7-2
that conduct need not be egregious in order to support a
punitive damages award.153 Rather, a plaintiff only need show
that an employer acted, “in the face of a perceived risk that its
actions will violate federal law to be liable in punitive
damages.”154 However, the Court created a good faith
compliance defense under which punitive liability can be
avoided by showing that the employer implemented measures
to prevent, detect, and remediate discrimination and
harassment.155 The Court noted that “[d]issuading employers
from implementing programs or policies to prevent
discrimination in the workplace is directly contrary to the
147
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purposes underlying Title VII. The statute’s ‘primary objective’
is ‘a prophylactic one’ . . . .”156
These cases represent an express recognition by the
Supreme Court that Title VII was intended to encourage
preventive, conciliatory measures over litigation.157 As the
Court observed in Faragher, “[a]lthough Title VII seeks ‘to
make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of
unlawful employment discrimination, its ‘primary objective,’
like that of any statute meant to influence primary conduct, is
not to provide redress but to avoid harm.”158 The Court went on
to point to the regulations that instruct employees on how to
raise complaints, observing:
It would therefore implement clear statutory policy and complement
the Government’s Title VII enforcement efforts to recognize the
employer’s affirmative obligation to prevent violations and give
credit here to employers who make reasonable efforts to discharge
their duty. Indeed, a theory of vicarious liability for misuse of
supervisory power would be at odds with the statutory policy if it
failed to provide employers with some such incentive.159

Thus, the Supreme Court’s guidance in these cases makes clear
that preventative measures are a primary objective of federal
antidiscrimination law.
These cases had significant impact on employers;
indeed, it is not an overstatement to say that they reshaped the
landscape of employment law. With this trilogy of decisions,
the Supreme Court extended the protection afforded to
employers who made good faith efforts to comply with federal
discrimination laws by recognizing such proactive measures as
both a defense to liability and punitive damages. This greatly
increased the incentive for employers to implement preventive
measures such as nondiscrimination policies and training.
Courts following Kolstad have considered several factors as
elements of the good-faith defense, such as: (1) a
comprehensive nondiscrimination/nonharassment policy, which
includes a complaints mechanism that is well-publicized and
readily available; coupled with (2) mandatory training for
156
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managers on their duty to act swiftly when they have
knowledge of claims; (3) prompt investigation of all complaints;
and (4) remedial measures where complaints are
substantiated.160 Thus, employers are tasked not only with
ensuring that a comprehensive antiharassment policy is
implemented, but also that preventative and remedial
measures are effective.161
Thus, preventative measures as endorsed by the Court
have become imbedded as an integral part of corporate
culture.162 Such measures can most effectively be tailored when
they are based on an organization’s assessment of its issues
and needs. However, companies can not engage in this selfanalysis with the rigor that is warranted in order to make it
effective unless they can do so with the certainty that the
results are not going to wind up in litigation.
These cases set up a framework to encourage employers
to engage in self-examination in order to minimize liability and
to detect and fix problems before they arise. In light of this
guidance, courts need to reevaluate the importance of providing
confidentiality by way of the self-critical analysis privilege. The
courts’ unwillingness to infer the privilege should therefore be
reexamined.
IV.

RECOGNITION OF THE SELF-CRITICAL ANALYSIS
PRIVILEGE IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT

To remedy courts’ mistaken rejection of the self-critical
analysis privilege in the employment context, the narrow
confines of Webb should be rejected in favor of the precedent set
by more recent and applicable Supreme Court precedent.
Critics argue that the privilege is unnecessary and obstructs
employee and government efforts to address discrimination.
However, unlike the protections of the existing recognized
privileges, the self-critical analysis privilege recognized in the
employment context ultimately supports the larger goal of
preventing employee discrimination.
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Proposal for the Recognition of the Privilege

Having established that the current situation—
infrequent and uncertain recognition of the self-critical
analysis privilege in the employment context—is based on
erroneous assumptions and creates a situation that is not
conducive to fostering diversity and positive workplace
relations, an alternative proposal must be offered. Some
commentators have suggested a legislative or administrative
solution, in which the self-critical analysis privilege might be
codified by statute or amendment to the Federal Rules of
Evidence.163 However, the fact that the evolution of privileges in
federal jurisprudence has primarily been a matter of common
law, coupled with the cumbersome nature of the legislative and
rule-making processes, suggests that this may not be the most
timely or effective solution. Additionally, despite the latitude
provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts are generally
reluctant to recognize new privileges164 or to expand the bounds
of existing ones, due in large part to the presumption that
litigants should have access to “every man’s evidence.”165
Of course, ideally the Supreme Court would issue a new
decision—one that explicitly revisits and clarifies the
applicability of the self-critical analysis privilege in the
employment context in light of the changing nature of
employment law and the Court’s more recent decisions
emphasizing the importance of preventative measures.
However, given that there are presently no cases addressing
this issue pending before the Court, this resolution seems
neither imminent nor likely.
Fortunately, courts do not need further legislative or
Supreme Court guidance in order to properly address this
issue. Rather, they simply need to revisit the Supreme Court
jurisprudence that has evolved subsequent to the University of
Pennsylvania case, primarily Faragher, Ellerth, and Kolstad.166
These cases make clear that prevention of employment
discrimination is a primary objective of Title VII, and
companies need to be incentivized and rewarded for taking
proactive steps such as self-examination of policies, procedures,
163
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demographics, workplace culture, and other diversity and
equality issues.
Having established that the Supreme Court
jurisprudence not only provides a basis, but indeed a mandate,
for recognition of the self-critical analysis privilege with respect
to employment documents such as diversity studies, the
question becomes: What should that privilege look like?
First, it is clear that the narrow confines of the Webb
analysis should be discarded. Specifically, the limitation that
only documents produced as a result of mandatory government
reporting should be protected by the privilege is outmoded and
without merit. The instruction, established by the more recent
Supreme Court cases, that companies engage in proactive
behavior to identify and remedy discrimination, requires that
they engage in self-examination well beyond the reporting
requirements that some companies as federal contractors are
required to undertake. Indeed, voluntary self-analysis is at the
very heart of the kind of preventive compliance to ensure a
discrimination-free workplace that both Title VII and the
Supreme Court cases interpreting the statute intended. Thus,
voluntary self-examination should be given the same protection
as mandatory reports.
Similarly, the distinction created in Webb—whereby
documents or portions of documents containing subjective
analysis should be protected while the objective portions of
such documents must be produced—should be abolished.
Companies should not be required to disclose objective portions
of self-critical studies where the studies involved a
determination as to which data should be included and how it
should be tabulated—decisions that are in themselves
subjective self-critical analysis and an integral part of the selfexamination process.
Stripped of the confines and artificial strictures of the
Webb analysis, the question remains: How then should the
applicability of self-critical analysis in employment cases be
determined? The courts need to return to the Wigmore
analysis, which lies at the heart of any assessment of privilege.
Under this conceptualization, a court would first consider as a
threshold matter: (1) the nature of the confidential
relationship; (2) the value society places on the relationship;
and (3) the expectation of privacy that was contemplated in

602

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:2

making the communication in question.167 In many, but not all,
cases, these three factors will weigh in favor of protecting selfexamination undertaken by companies with respect to diversity
in the workplace. In cases where one or more of these initial
criteria are not met, the court should not protect the documents
as privileged.
In cases where these preliminary criteria are met, the
court should focus its analysis on the fourth prong—the
relative harm-versus-benefit of disclosure. This balancing test
will allow the court to take into account nuanced
considerations, such as the nature of the plaintiff’s claims
relative to the types of documents sought, and make a
determination of how the purpose of the law can best be served.
The proposed privilege is not without its limitations and
must contain several important parameters. First, where the
conduct of the diversity committee and its reports are actually
at issue in the case (for example, where the plaintiff alleges
that the company’s diversity activities are in themselves
discriminatory) the privilege would not apply.
Additionally, where the defendant company puts its
diversity initiatives at issue in the case, submitting, for example,
a diversity study as evidence that is has not engaged in
discriminatory practices, the privilege would be waived. As one
court noted in holding that such documents were not protected,
The court need not reach the privilege questions . . . the defendant has
disseminated the affirmative action plan itself in response to public
pressure regarding minority hiring. . . . In such circumstances, it must
be concluded that defendant has waived any privilege to withhold
information the business has already publicly disclosed voluntarily in
the exercise of sound business judgment about how to diffuse protest
aimed at the company.168

B.

Addressing the Critics

Clearly, the proposal that the self-critical analysis
privilege applies in the employment context is not without its
detractors. Armed with decades of jurisprudence, critics
contend that the privilege should not be recognized because: (1)
other privileges or doctrines are sufficient to protect the
documents;169 (2) recognition of the privilege would deny
167
168
169
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litigants information needed to pursue claims and hamper
government enforcement efforts;170 and (3) that the privilege
would not go far enough to justify its creation. However, an
examination of existing privilege law quickly demonstrates
that it is insufficient to protect employment documents such as
the diversity studies contemplated herein. Moreover, the welltailored privilege set forth in the proposal, when carefully
applied, would not preclude plaintiffs or government agencies
from obtaining the documents they need.
1. Other Privileges Are Insufficient to Protect Diversity
Documents
Critics attempt to deny the validity of the self-critical
analysis privilege in the employment context by claiming that it is
not needed because other privileges and doctrines, such as
attorney-client privilege, attorney work product, and the
subsequent repairs doctrine, can cover any documents that should
rightfully be protected. An examination of those mechanisms
makes clear that they are insufficient to fulfill this purpose.
For example, one suggested alternative to self-critical
analysis privilege is that the attorney-client privilege, which
protects communications between counsel and the party he or
she represents, can protect employment documents in lieu of
the self-critical analysis privilege.171 However, this privilege
falls far short of protecting documents such as diversity
studies.172 As an initial matter, the attorney-client privilege only
applies where a client is seeking legal advice from counsel, but
diversity analyses are often conducted by nonlegal personnel
such as human resources or employee relations personnel.173
Moreover, diversity studies do not solely or even primarily
consist of the kind of legal advice that would be protected by
attorney-client privilege, but cover a wide range of business
topics including organizational dynamics and social and
cultural issues.
Additionally, with respect to the attorney-client privilege
in the corporate context, there is a question of who is the client.
Generally the protection of the privilege only extends to
170
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corporate officers and supervisory personnel.174 Thus,
communications by many of the participants in diversity studies,
including the rank and file employees, would not be protected.175
For similar reasons, the attorney work product doctrine,
which protects documents containing the opinions, mental
processes, and opinions of counsel, would not suffice to protect
diversity documents.176 In addition to sharing the problem with
attorney-client privilege that many diversity studies are not
prepared by counsel, the attorney work product doctrine
protects only documents prepared in anticipation of litigation—
the majority of diversity studies are undertaken proactively
rather than in anticipation of litigation and therefore would fall
outside the privilege’s protections.177
Some commentators have suggested that selfexamination documents such as diversity studies might, in the
alternative, find protection under Federal Rule of Evidence
407, more commonly known as the subsequent remedial
measures doctrine.178 As codified in Federal Rule of Evidence
407, the doctrine provides:
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event,
measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the
injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent
measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a
defect in a product, a defect in a product’s design, or a need for a
warning or instruction.179

Thus, under Rule 407, remedial measures undertaken
subsequent to an incident are not admissible for purposes of
proving liability. This rule, however, will generally be
insufficient to protect self-examination documents such as
diversity studies. First, because it is not a privilege, but rather
a rule regarding admissibility of evidence, the diversity
documents will likely still be discoverable by adverse parties in
litigation, even if deemed inadmissible at trial.180 The present
chilling effects of discovery would therefore persist unabated.
174
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Further, the rule only protects studies or measures that are
taken subsequent to an injury or claim, not those that are
taken beforehand, as is the case with most diversity studies
sought in litigation.181
Notwithstanding the fact that Rule 407 is in itself
insufficient to protect documents of the scope and nature of
diversity studies, its rationale is helpful in understanding why
such documents should be protected under the analogous selfcritical analysis privilege: “Rule 407 is designed to protect the
important policy of encouraging defendants to repair and
improve their products and premises without the fear that such
actions will be used later against them in a lawsuit.”182 The
rationale that protects documents related to measures taken
after injury surely must apply with equal, if not greater, force
to preventive measures designed to avoid harm in the first
place, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s emphasis on
such proactive steps.
2. The Privilege Will Not Hamper Private Claims or
Government Enforcement
Perhaps most fundamentally, opponents express
concern that application of the self-critical analysis privilege to
employment documents such as diversity studies will preclude
plaintiffs from obtaining the information they need to seek
redress of their claims.183 This is an argument that could be
made with respect to the self-critical analysis privilege in other
areas of the law, or for that matter, with respect to any
privilege at all. Taken to its utmost extreme, an argument such
as this, which places overwhelming and undue emphasis on a
litigant’s need for access to documents, would destroy the
privileged relationships fundamental to our society by
undermining well-established privileges such as the attorneyclient privilege and eliminating the societal benefit that flows
from the candor in such privileged relationships.184
Dealt with in the limited context of employment
discrimination, however, this argument still does not undermine
181
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recognition of the privilege. First, it is clear that the purpose and
intent of Title VII, as articulated in the more recent Supreme
Court cases, emphasize that preventive measures are to be
valued, encouraged, and placed on at least equal—if not
greater—footing with the need for an individual to redress his or
her claims.185 If the critics’ argument is allowed to win the day,
then the claims of individuals (the merits of which have not yet
been assessed) would prevent institutional discourse and reform,
to the detriment of the employees at large.
Moreover, the proposed framework for the application of
the self-critical analysis privilege to employment documents
contemplates and addresses concerns about individual
employees’ need for information to pursue their claims. The
privilege is qualified subject to the balancing analysis set forth
by Wigmore, which considers, on a case-by-case basis, the
plaintiff’s need to have access to such information. Indeed, the
balancing inquiry favors the rights of plaintiffs as it requires
the harm of disclosure to outweigh the benefits before the
privilege will apply, and places the burden on defendant
companies to show why documents should be protected.
Additionally, while plaintiffs may not have access to the selfcritical documents in cases where the privilege is properly
applied and the balance tips in favor of non-disclosure, they are
not precluded from obtaining any of the underlying data
through well-crafted discovery requests.186 They also continue to
have access through discovery to the myriad other information,
including documents regarding their own employment, and, to
the extent relevant, documents regarding comparable
employees and the company at-large.
Nor, as critics contend, will recognition of the selfcritical analysis privilege hamper government agencies in their
enforcement roles.187 A carefully tailored application of the
balancing test would still permit government agencies to obtain
the mandatory reports and other documents to which they are
entitled as a matter of law where appropriate, perhaps
pursuant to a protective order to prevent further disclosure.188
As with private plaintiffs, the Wigmore balancing test would
also permit disclosure of self-examination documents to
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governmental agencies where the company could not show that
the harm of disclosure would outweigh the benefit.
Finally, as at least one commentator has noted, there
are benefits to government enforcement entitles from effective
self-analysis:
Potential advantages include helping businesses cut through often
complex regulations by affording them a detailed breakdown of their
operations (which also allows them to detect operational problems
before they become more severe), and reducing the billions of dollars
a year spent on governmental attempts to regulate industry.189

Another observed that the privilege “should be expanded
because it generates positive net social utility by facilitating
corporate self-regulatory conduct at minimal social cost.”190
3. Other Criticisms
The proposal for a test that balances the benefits and
harms of disclosure is also subject to criticism from those who do
not feel it goes far enough. For example, some commentators
have suggested that a balancing test does not provide enough
certainty for companies and will not alleviate the chilling effects,
instead proposing a blanket protection for internal corporate
studies.191 Others have suggested, in a similar vein, that these
studies be protected by a self-critical analysis privilege that is
coextensive with the deliberative privilege enjoyed by
governmental agencies with respect to their investigations.192
These proposals, while conceived from the same impetus
as the framework suggested herein—the desire to encourage
socially beneficial self-examination by corporate actors—are
simply not feasible. First, the notion of a blanket privilege for
internal corporate studies fails to take into account the nature
of a qualified privilege, which will be considered subject to the
relative interests of the parties in a particular case and in light
of the circumstances and policies implicated. Moreover, in the
employment context, where the contemplation of privilege must
take into account the competing objectives of Title VII of
encouraging measures that prevent discrimination and
allowing those who believe they have suffered discrimination
189
190
191
192
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redress of their claims, a blanket protection would not give
sufficient consideration to the latter of these aims.
Similarly, the notion that self-critical analysis should
enjoy blanket protection tantamount to the governmental
deliberative privilege goes too far. The role of the government
in an investigation on behalf of a third party differs greatly, in
terms of objectives and self-interest, from that of a defendant
corporation in litigation, and the extent to which the two
privileges respectively protect documents needs to reflect that
important difference.
Finally, some critics may argue that the implementation
of the Wigmore criteria, which requires a case-by-case
balancing of factors, will in fact result in more uncertainty than
the bright-line approach adopted by courts that have embraced
the Webb criteria. As an initial matter, it is clear that by
eschewing the flawed distinctions inherent in the Webb criteria
(that is, protecting mandatory studies but not voluntary ones
and protecting subjective portions of reports but not “objective”
data), companies can voluntarily undertake comprehensive
diversity initiatives with greater certainty that their selfanalysis will be entitled to at least a qualified protection by the
privilege. More fundamentally, by applying the Wigmore
criteria with a mindful eye toward the Supreme Court’s
guidance in Faragher, Ellerth and Kolstad that preventative
measures are to be given primacy over litigious ones as a
means of furthering diversity and equal employment and
eliminating discrimination, courts will undoubtedly conclude,
absent a showing of an unusual and compelling need by a
plaintiff, that the self-critical analysis privilege should apply to
the majority of diversity initiatives. This conclusion will result
in greater protection and certainty.
The proposed balancing analysis is a strong middle
ground. It allows corporations to engage, with reasonable
certainty, in self-examination such as diversity studies with
the expectation that they will generally not be discoverable,
while still providing a plaintiff with the ability to obtain
information if he or she can show a direct need for it based on
the claims and circumstances of the case.
CONCLUSION
There is undisputed benefit in diversity initiatives and
discussions undertaken by employers. However, such steps
cannot be freely taken while the threat of disclosure in
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litigation looms. The most effective way to encourage such
measures is to provide self-examination documents and
information with a qualified self-critical analysis privilege.
While courts have been reluctant to recognize the privilege,
this situation may be remedied by revisiting the more recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Careful examination of the cases
reveals that the courts’ emphasis is misplaced and should focus
on the changing nature of employment law and the primacy of
preventative measures, as embodied in the trilogy of Faragher,
Ellerth, and Kolstad. Armed with these decisions, courts can
recognize and apply a carefully tailored privilege that balances
the harms of disclosure against the benefits, thereby protecting
the right of plaintiffs to pursue their claims, but also allowing
rigorous candid self-analysis and dialogue to the benefit of the
larger workforce.
The Beer Summit exemplified the benefits of open
communication in the resolution of diversity-related conflicts
and the ways in which such open discourse can be used to
improve diversity and relationships going forward. However,
unlike the events in Cambridge that culminated in the Beer
Summit, most conflicts do not enjoy the benefit of presidential
mediation to facilitate resolution. Absent such divine
intervention, a qualified self-critical analysis privilege for
employment documents, such as the one proposed herein,
would serve as an effective means of encouraging companies to
review their actions, foster dialogue, and take proactive steps
toward improving diversity.

